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Affirmative Action as Earnings Redistribution:
The Targeting of Compliance Reviews
ABSTRACT
Affirmativeaction may be broadly conceived of as pursuing either the goal
of reducing discrimination or that of redistributing jobs and earnings. I
attempt to infer the ends of affirmative action policy by analyzing the historical
record of enforcement. Optimal enforcement strategies are developed for both
the anti-discrimination and the earnings redistribution models, and then com-
pared with new data on the actual targeting of affirmative action compliance
reviews during the late 1970s. I find that establishments with very low propor-
tions of minority or female workers are not significantly more likely to be
reviewed, but that white-collar intensive establishments are more likely to be
reviewed. This indicates the shortcomings of the anti-discrimination model in









In the beginning, the purpose of the affirmative action obligation placed on
federal contractors by a series of Executive Orders was to eliminate currcnt discrimi-
nation in employment. Under Executive Order 11246, federal contractors agree 'not
to discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment becausu of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin, and to take affirmative action to ensure that
applicants are employed and employees are treated during employment without
regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin." [3 C.F.R. 169
202(l)(1974)]. This language imposes two obligations: first, not to discriminate;
second, whether or not there is any evidence of discrimination, to take affirmative
action not to discriminate. It is a measure of this nation's progress that the first obli-
gation is now largely beyond debate. The redundant sounding second obligation, how-
ever, is anything but. It has provoked continual controversy, and its meaning and
effect are not well understood. In the heated political arguments over whether and
what affirmative action should be, mythic visions have come to overwhelm any clear
conception of what affirmative action actually is.
Affirmative action can be broadly conceived of as pursuing either anti-
discrimination or job and earnings redistribution goals. That is to say, it can either
pursue equality of opportunity or equality of result. Given the historical record, pro-
gress toward the former goal will often entail progress toward the latter. Job or earn-
ings redistribution, however, can proceed with little if any amelioration of discrimina-
tion. The central question this paper seeks to answer is: what are the actual goals of
affirmative action? The approach taken here is to infer the ends of affirmative action
policy from an analysis of the historical record of actual enforcement.
The analysis develops in five parts. Section II develops two polar models of how
affirmative action should be enforced: first. assuming that the goal of affirmative action
is to reduce employment discrimination, and second assuming that the goal is to-4-
redistribute jobs and earnings to minorities and females. Section III briefly reviews
the lonely past work on this question, and Section IV discusses the new and detailed
data set developed to test the competing hypotheses. The main empirical findings are
presented in Section V. Section VI presents the conclusion of this research: the tar-
geting of affirmative action compliance reviews is inconsistent with a program whose
primary purpose is to fight the most blatant form of current employment discrimina-
tion. The evidence to be presented here suggests that affirmative action can be more
usefully thought of as a program to redistribute jobs and earnings to minorities and
females.
II. Models of Regulatory Behavior.
Since 1978, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) has been
responsible for enforcing affirmative action under Executive Order 11246. In particu-
lar, the OFCCP is the federal agency with primary responsibility for pursuing cases of
systematic employment discrimination. If the OFCCP were concerned solely with
reducing current employment discrimination, how should it then target enforcement
pressure? How should it decide which establishments to review?
Although subtle forms of discrimination may not reveal themselves in the under-
representation of members of a given group, statistical underrepresentation does pro-
vide prima facie evidence, though certainly not proof, of discrimination. Complete
screening for discrimination would test every aspect of the employment relationship
for color arid sex blindness. This is costly, so it seems reasonable to select for further
investigation those establishments in which minorities or females are under-
represented in employment. While the operational definition of underrepresentation
has been debated in lengthy detail in the courts and elsewhere, all that needs to be
pointed out here is that by issuing a set of vague and self-contradictory regulations,
the OFCCP has left itself virtually unrestrained in this area.-5-
To simplify the discussion, assume a fixed and known labor supply,common to all
firms. Let ir percent of a labor force population be black, with population variance
(rr)(i-rr). Think of a rm's employment practices as a color blind draw withreplace-
ment from this population. The expected value of F, the sample meanpercent black,
is 7T.Thevariance of the sample mean is then (rr)(i —)/ N,where N is firm size. If no
firms discriminate, then randomly we expect 2.5 of all firms toemploy fewer than
ir—2ir(1—ir)/N percent black.
The legal and administrative use of underrepresentation asprima facie evidence
of discrimination presumes that discriminators are more likely to be in the tail of the
distribution. But how should the OFCCP select the threshold al.. which it willreject the
null hypothesis of non-discrimination? This will depend on the relative cost ofmaking
type I and type II errors.
One goal of the regulatory bureaucracy is to live andgrow by maximizing net pol-
itical support. If the OFCCP's political base lay in anti-discrimination it wouldgain
political support by minimizing type II errors. If this were all that mattered it would
set a low threshold and would pressure all firms. Baiancing this incentive is the cost.
of a type I error. At low thresholds, many non-discriminating firms will be harassed,
breeding antagonism and eating away political support1.
The regulator's tradeofT involves solving:




where P is the threshold level. Firms with percent black below P are audited.
(P) is the probability of a type I error, of falsely accusing under the null
hypothesis that firms do not discriminate, a' > 0.
(P) is the probability of a type 11 error, letting the guilty go.< 0.
N(P) is the density function of number of firms by percent black.-6-
Z is the political benefit of correctly identifying a discriminating firm.
U1 is the political cost of a type I error: false]y pursuing the innocent.
U11 is the political cost of a type TI error: allowing discriminators to operate
u n e h ul I en g e 1.
Cç' is the cost of a review.
X is any politically neutral but financially costly activity of the regulator.
Y is the regulator's budget.
The first order condition states that to maximize political support while satisfying
the budget constraint, the regulator should increase P until the marginal benefit of
catching discriminators is equal to the marginal cost of false accusations, additional
reviews, and missing discriminators.
The variance of the sample mean decreases with sample size, so the prima facie
evidence of discrimination in a firm with a given percent black is statistically stronger
the larger the work force of the firm. Intuitively, as the firm draws a larger sample it
is more likely to resemble the population. To hold the probability of a type I error
fixed, as firm size n increases, P1 —thelevel below which regulatory pressure is
applied —must also increase. We know that a = Prob(P<rr—kaa), where rr is the popu-
lation mean, and k is read o a table of the binomial or normal distribution. The
threshold level P1 is equal to ir—kacr ,where a=(rr(l—ir)/n)''2
So
dP1 / dn = (ka/ 2n) ((rr(1—ir))/ n)"2 (3)
This is positive, so holding a fixed implies that as the firm size innreases the regulator
should pursue flrnis with higher black representation. This is important since there is
in fact -a broad range of firm sizes, and a may be presumed to be small. Ii. would be
irrelevant for large a, since ka goes to infinity as a increases.
Can other factors overturn the implication that regulators attempting to reduce
discrimination in employment as we have defined it above, should pursue firms in the-7-
lower tail of the distribution first'? Spillover eects are an important consideration.
Shouldn't the OFCCP go after the firms with the highest representation of minorities
or females? This may set an example to all firms of the OFCCP's high standards, and
send the message that. none are free from sin. Alternatively, what if there is tipping
behavior, or if some firms are pushovers that, yield easily to pressure, so that the regu-
latory costs of achieving a given increase in minority or female representation are
lower at a firm with a high initial representation2'? The problem with both these
scenarios is that they create perverse incentives over time. Punishing friends and
ignoring enemies eventually undermines the legitimacy and eectiveness of the pro-
gram.
The main testable implications of this model then are that the OFCCP should tar-
get for compliance reviews those firms in the bottorri tail of the distribution of minor-
ity or female representation, and that it should proceed further up this tail toward the
mean as firm size increases3.
Targeting to Redistribute Earnings
To think of affirmative action solely as policy against discrimination is to mistake
the essenee of affirmative action. Affirmative action does not in practice promote
blindness toward race or sex. As its common nanie hints, Executive Order 11246 in
practice requires contractors to take affirmative action to increase employment
opportunities for people chosen on the basis of race and sex, irrespective of whether
or not the firm has been discriminating.
In the words of then Under Secretary of Labor, Laurence Silberman: "One of the
interesting things about the affirmative action concept, it is not antidiscrimination It
goes beyond that ... Weand the compliance agencies put pressure on contractors to
come up with commitments even though these contractors are not guilt.y of any
discrimination, but because we think they are required under the Executive order to
go beyond, to provide affirmative action."4-8-
Speculate a moment on the sources of political support for affirmative action.
Why should a politician support affirmative action? Who will support her if she does?
Obviously blacks and women are the largest direct beneficiaries of affirmative action,
absent civi] disorder, and among these one might expect the politician will respond to
the wishes of those most likely to support her with votes and money. This suggests a
very dierent conception of how OFCCP regulatory pressure may be targeted.
How does an individual gain from affirmative action? If affirmative action is viewed
as a policy of anti-discrimination, she gains from a broader choice set, a feeling of jus-
tice and equal protection under the law, and indirectly from increased earnings. A
broader choice of employment only makes the individual better off in effect if she ends
up in a better job. Increasing the choice set does not by itself necessarily increase
utility. While feelings of justice may promote the authority of the state, they do not
put bread on the table. The premise of this section is that political support for
affirmative action depends on individual gain in the form of increased earnings.
Relating this in rriore formal economic terms, political support is proportional to
workers' surplus: the area above the supply curve and beneath the wage. Executive
Order 11246 imposes employment goals, not wage goals. For a given induced shift in
employment, workers surplus will be greater the more inelastic is the supply and will
depend not at all on the elasticity of demand. Graphically, for the linear supply in Fig-
ure 1, the increase in worker surplus is 5W.N +NAW,where W is the increase in
wages, iN is the fixed increase in employment, and N0 is initial employment. This
surplus increases with LW which increases with the inelasticity of supply5.
If political support is proportional to rents, then the OFCCP will elicit more sup-
port from minorities and females by targeting enforcement pressure where supply is
inelastic. So affirmative action pressure should be stronger in occupations requiring
high skills and high education, in which people are also more likely to be politically
active, and which are after all, in my opinion, the true battlefield of affirmative action.-9-
It is a battlefield because it is these same cases of inelastic supply that provoke the
most political backlash. Firms are more sensitive to quality differentials, have more
difficulty meeting employment goals, and are under pressure to raise wages to do so.
As their relative wage declines, white males are seized by concern with inequity6.
Highly skilled minorities and females have a strong incentive to use the govern-
ment to increase the demand for their services. This makes an interesting contrast
with unions, which sometimes restrict supply, depend. for their effectiveness on the
elasticity of demand, are more prevalent and at least as important among the low-
skilled as among the high-skilled, and which must face a tradeoff between higher
wages or more jobs. In terms of redistributing income, the OFCCP acts as an ideal
union: it increases wages without decreasing employment for its members; a history of
discrimination pays the dues for the group.
Ill. Past Study
Assertions concerning the ends of arniative action are surprisingly common,
especially when one realizes that only once in the past has the actual pattern of
enforcement been analyzed. This pathhreaking study by Heckman and Wolpin exam-
ined the incidence of compliance reviews at a sample of 1185 Chicago area establish-
ments during 1972. These compliance reviews are the first, the most conirnon, and
usually the last step in the enforcement process. I-leckman and Wolpin find that the
probability of review is not affected by establishment size, minority employment, or
change in minority employment. They discover "no evidence of a systematic govern-
ment policy for reviewing contractor firms". In other words, they find an essentially
random enforcement process. This first analysis of targeting studied a relatively small
sample in one city during the early 1970's, before the contract compliance program
reached full stride. Do these early findings hold true for the nation as a whole after
affirmative action regulations and procedures matured? Just as importantly, how are
such results to be interpreted?- 10-
TV. Data
Thehistorical review patterns studied here are based on OFCCP administrative
records, made available by the OFCCP's Division of Program Analysis. The records I
had access to were not a complete record of all reviews. Rather, these consisted pri-
marily of reviews conducted by the Department of Defense, which accounted for
nearly half of all pre-consolidation reviews. For example, while the U.S.C.C.R. reports
that 10,647 compliance reviews were conducted in 1976, 1 have records of about 4300,
of which about half cannot be matched with EEO-1 records because they lack identify-
ing numbers. Conversations with OFCCP officials lead me to believe the remaining
underreporting of reviews is largely random.
separately I assembled a sample of 68690 establishments with matched EEO-1
flies in 1974 and 1980, of which 41281 establishments were contractors in 1974. I
then matched this file with the file of compliance reviews. 6.36i of the establishments
that were contractors in 1974 had completed at least one compliance review in the five
years from 1975 to 1979. Since the reported reviews were primarily conducted by
DOD, the sample was then correspondingly limited to those contractors in DOD's terri-
tory. According to the LT.S. Commission on Civil Rights, DOD had full responsibility for
monitoring the compliance of all contractors within the following major industry
groups: textile, apparel, printing, publishing, leather, primary metal, fabricated metal,
electrical and non-electrical machinery, motor vehicles, aircraft, miscellaneous
manufacturing, business services except miscellaneous, retail automotive dealers,
retail apparel stores, and wholesale miscellaneous durable goods, along with a few
smaller non-manufacturing sectors not considered here. The results that follow are
based on establishments in these industries, which for simplicity will be referred to as
defense contractors. This subsample includes 70 percent of all identiable reported
reviews.- 11-
V. Leaning on Open Doors -Patternsof Enforcement.
Which establishments does the OFCCP actually choose to review? Can we judge its
rnotiv-es from its targeting policy, and do the goals so revealed conform to those man-
dated in the Executive Order? The OFCCP has had, on paper, formal targeting systems
such as the Revised MeKersie System or the later ETSEN system. These systemsgerl-
erally target in a sensible fashion against discrimination by selecting for review those
establishnierits with a low proportion of minorities or females relative to other estab-
lishments in the sarrie area and industry. But interviews with OFCCP officials in Wash-
ington and in t.he field suggest that these formal targeting systems were never really
used. Instead of targeting on the basis of an establishment's past demographic
record, compliance officers claim they simply reviewed the firms with the most employ-
ees, and the growing firms8. This section shows which t.ypes of establishments were
actually reviewed between 1974 and 1980, primarily by the Department of Defense. As
such, the patterns shown here may not be indicative of current policies or practices of
the OFCCP, nor of past practices of other compliance agencies.
Before examining actual enforcement patterns, the official OFCCP policy on com-
pliance reviews may be briefly stated.9
"Before OFCCP consolidation, agencies were generally advised to select for
review those contractor establishments that offered the greatest opportuni-
ties for employment and advancement of minorities and wonien, taking into
consideration such factors as size, location with regard to centers of minor-
ity population, turnover rate and EEO profile. Also, regulations required the
performance of compliance reviews prior to the awarding of contracts of 1
million or more regardless of the relative size of the establishment. Thus, a
wide mix of large and small contractors was reviewed. Some agencies
endeavored to schedule for review establishments that had relatively poor
EEO profiles or were the subjects of numerous complaints from the communi-- 12-
tiesin which they were situated. After consolidation, OFCCP directed special
eorts to accomplishing reviews in various industries which had not experi-
enced much review activity before, or which were believed likely to contain
numerous aected classes of persons of the protected groups."
Bivariate Results
There are some surprising results in the cross-tabulations presented in Tables 1
to 5, which are not obviously coherent with an efficient targeting strategy. Completely
segregated firms—those with either no females or no black males—are among the least
likely to be reviewed. Growing establishments are not more likely to be reviewed than
stable ones, and the largest establishments are reviewed wit.h less frequency than
medium sized ones.. Amidst this detail, it is important not to lose sight. of the evidence
of a comprehensive enforcement eort here. In the years 1975 to 1979, compliance
reviews were reported at 23 percent of all the establishments that were labeled as
federal contractors in 1974 in industries for which DOD was responsible before conso-
lidation.
Twenty-two percent of the 7968 contractor establishments reported that they
employed no black males in 1974. Of these, 11 percent were reviewed in the subse-
quent years 1975 to 1979. In contrast, 25 percent of the establishments that were
twenty percent or more black male were reviewed. Table 1 reveals no consistent pat-
tern of reviews as a function of percent black male. The establishments most likely to
be reviewed in Table 1 are those with between ten and twenty percent black male, well
above the mean black male representation of six percent. Establishments at either
tail of the distribution, with either few or many black males, were less likely to be
reviewed. Caution must be exercised in interpreting this finding, since we have not yet
corrected for geographic area. In particular, if the establishments with few blacks
were all located in areas of the country in which few blacks lived, their low review
rates would riiake more sense.- 13-
Femalesdo not live in ghettos, and can be found even in the farthest reaches of
North Dakota, Alaska or Maine. Comparing review frequency by female share, Table 2
demonstrates a less easily explained inconsistency. None of the 74 establishments
without any female employees were reviewed. More likely to be reviewed were estab-
lishments at the other end of the scale: 28 percent of the establishments that were
70% or more female were reviewed. The highest incidence of review, 30 percent,
occurred among establishments that were 35 to 40 percent female, above the mean
female share of 32 percent.
A more sensible pattern of reviews emerges across establishments of diflerent
sizes. The smallest. establishments are the least likely to have been reviewed, as Table
3 indicates. Only 5 percent of the quarter of establishments with fewer than 100
employees in 1974 were reviewed in subsequent years. New regulations proposed early
in the Reagan administration would have reduced the burden of affirmative action
regulation for establishments with less than 250 employees. Table 3 suggests the pol-
itical turrrioil over the issue turned in some part on its symbolic importance, since less
than twelve percent of such small contractor establishments had been reviewed. Com-
pliance revi.ews have always been concentrated at large establishments. The
economies of scale in targeting large establishments must be balanced against the
benefits of maintaining some perceived pressure on smaller establishments. It is also
worth noting that other work suggests that the contractor compliance program has
had a greater relative impact on minority and female employment. at larger establish-
men t s.
The other notable finding in Table 3 is that review incidence peaks at mid-size
establishments with 750 to 1000 employees. If economies of scale were dominating the
targeting of reviews then one would expect review intensity to increase mnonotonically
with size, but in Table 3 the largest establishments with more than 1000 employees are
less likely to be reviewed than mid-size establishments.- 14-
Inconversations OFCCP officials have said they also try to target growing estab-
lishrnents that will have greater opportunities to hire minorities and females without
directly displacing white males. This does not appear to be the case in Table 4. While
establishments that experienced a 30 percent or greater reduction in their work force
between 1974 and 1980 were slightly less likely to be reviewed than those that grew by
30 percent or more, the differences in review incidence by growth rate are not
marked. However, fluctuations at small establishments may be obscuring the underly-
ing patterns within size classes10.
The intensity of review does differ greatly across sectors, as Table 5 demon-
strates. Fewer than six percent of all contractors were reviewed in the non-
manufacturing sectors for which DOD was responsible. Since large establishment
workforces in these sectors are rare, this is probably a function of size. Within the
manufacturing sector, the incidence of reviews ranged from 12 percent in printing
and 17 percent in fabricated metal, up to 39 percent in apparel and 42 percent in tex-
tiles.
Multivariate Results
Here we expand on the previous findings by controlling for differences across a
number of variables at the same time in logit estimates of the probability of undergo-
ing a compliance review. The estimates in Table 6 indicate that the establishments
least likely to be reviewed for compliance are those that are 100% white male, and this
is significant. Establishments with less than three percent non-white male are
significantly less likely to be reviewed than those with more than fifteen percent. Just
as disturbing, establishments with less than twenty percent female are significantly
less likely to be reviewed than those with more than fifty percent. In other words, the
greater the proportion female or minority male, the more likely to be reviewed11. This
is just the opposite of what one would expect from a program targeted against the
most. simple sort of prima facie discrimination.- 15-
Themodel of affirmative action as an earnings redistribution program has two
testable implications. One can at best offer weak support for the hypothesis, while the
second can provide somewhat stronger support.. The first. is that no particular pres-
sure should be applied to flrms with relatively few minorities or females. This is just
what we observe in Table 6. While this strongly rejects the model of affirmative action
as anti-discrirrnnation in employment, it otTers weak support for the alternative
hypothesis of affirmative action as earnings redistribution because it is also compati-
ble with other models of regulatory behavior. The second implication of the earnings
redistribution model is that greater pressure should be brought to bear to shift
demand curves where the supply of labor is relatively inelastic. In particular, this
implies a higher incidence of compliance reviews at establishments with non-clerical
white-collar intensive workforces. Again, Table 6 offers strong and significant evidence
that. this is exactly what the OFCCP has done, supporting the hypothesis that
affirmative action is an earnings redistribution program.
Larger establishrrients are more likely to be reviewed, although this tails off
among the very largest. Of course, establishment size is not synonymous with firm
size. Some of the sanctions used, such as backpay, are primarily a function of estab-
lishment characteristics. Debarment, on the other hand, affects an entire corpora-
tion. In light of such explicit or implicit spillovers between the establishment and the
corporation, firm size and corporate structure should play an important role. Table 6
indicates that establishments that are part of multi-plant corporations are
significantly more likely to be reviewed, as one would expect if economies of scale
across the corporation were important.
Note also that growing establishments, which could best accommodate the pres-
sures, are not significantly more likely to be reviewed. By industry, reviews are
signiñcantJy less likely in printing, but, significantly more likely in textiles, apparel,
machinery, and electrical equipment.-16-
One must question a process that results in multiple reviews at many establish-
ments that employ an above average proportion of minorities or females, while at the
same time seventeen percent of the contractors do not seem to realize that they are
federal contractors subject to the obligations of affirmative action.
Part of the relatively low probability of review among predominantly whi.te male
establishments niay be explained by the high within region variance in black popula-
tion share, especially outside the South, which is not directly controlled for in Table 6.
However, this type of argument is unlikely to account for the peculiar pattern among
females, who are homogeneously distributed geographically12. We turn next to a test
at a finer level of geographic detail.
Compliance Review Targeting in America's Largest Cities.
The drawback of the last table is that it controls only roughly for local labor
market conditions. This is potentially troublesome given the dispersion in minority
share within regions. Table 7 refines the multivariate analysis for six of the nation's
largest SMSAs: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit and San Fran-
cisco.
Even at this fine level of geographic detail in which the idiosyncrasies of local
labor markets are controlled for, the targeting of compliance reviews still shows
anomalous and perverse patterns.
Most striking, the few establishments with no female employees are significantly
less likely to be reviewed than those with at least one female employee. The greater
the proportion female, the greater the chances of being reviewed, although the
differences across establishments with at. least one female employee are insignificant.
In particular, the probability of review for an establishment with more than 50 percent
female does not differ significantly from that for one with from 1 to 50 percent female.
Establishments with rio non-white males are not significantly more likely to be
reviewed than those with more than 15 percent. Those with six to ten percent- 17-
minoritymales, still well below the sample mean of seventeen percent, are significantly
less likely to be reviewed than those with more than fifteen percent.
Sonic of the disturbing patterns previously observed with rougher geographic
controls are reduced here, but not enough to produce a pattern of sensible targeting
against discrimination. There is no evidence here that establishments with the smal-
lest proportion of minorities or females, ceteris paribus, are consistently more likely
to be reviewed for compliance with Executive Order 11246. Again, reviews are
significantly more likely to take place, ceteris paribus, in non-clerical white-collar
establishments13. Taken together with the evident lack of greater pressure on estab-
lishments with relatively few minorities or females, this suggests the contribution the
earnings redistribution model may make to understanding affirmative action.
VI. Conclusions
If one thought of the OFCCP's primary concern as fighting discrimination directly
in the workplace, one might then expect reviews to be concentrated. at establishments
with a relatively small proportion of females and black males, controlling for size,
industry and region. There is little consistent significant evidence of this is the past.
There is significant evidence here that the dominant targeting practice as stated in
interviews and as confirmed in Table 6 and 7, is to review large establishments. If pol-
itical support for the OFCCP were a function of workers' surplus, one would expect to
see compliance pressure targeted where labor demand was inelastic. Tables 6 and 7
show that establishment.s with proportionately more non-clerical white-collar jobs are
significantly more likely to be reviewed.
How can the lack of a con sistent targeting pattern by race or sex be explained?
The larger establishments often employ a greater proportion of minorities and
females. In interviews, field officers of the OFCCP have stated that. they do not gen-
erally look at an establishments past deniographic record in targeting reviews.
Reviewing large non-clerical white-collar intensive establishments with little regard for- 15-
theirpast record of minority or female employment is consistent with an affirmative
action effort that is primarily concerned not with attacking the grossest prima facie
forms of current employment discrimination, but rather with redistributing jobs and
earnings to minorities and women. ---19-
NOTES
A more complex model for richer empirical data might also include the respective
dependence and vulnerability to threats of the contractor and the government,
spillover effects on labor demand and supply across firms, regions, groups and
time, reputation effects, a regulatory production function, and a multi-stage
screening and penalty procedure. Some of these variants are explored in other
work. (Leonard, 1983).
2.Neither scenario can justify zero review probabilities. Even leaving aside the
counterproductive long-run incentives, there is no consistent evidence that
segregated establishments are more intransigent. In the subsample of establish-
ments with less than 3% black male employment, reviews still have a strong and
significant effect, and one that is not significantly less than in other establish-
ments. Similarly, the South does not differ significantly from the rest of the
nation in its response. On the other hand, in establishments with less than 10%
white female employment- primarily in transportation, utilities and wholesale
trade- there is some evidence that reviews reduce white female ethployment.
Both these results are sensitive to specification, but in general it cannot be
presumed that little could be gained in the short-run by reviewing white male
intensive establishments.
3. We concluded above that confronted with two firms with the same level of below
average black representation, the regulator should pursue the larger firni
because the evidence in favor of discrimination becomes more statistically com-
pelling with firm size. This conclusion must be tempered by placing the OFCCP
within its broader regulatory and legal context. Recourse to the OFCCP is not the
sole avenue open to victims of systematic discrimination: they may also bring suit
privately or through the EEOC under Title VII. The statistical evidence in large
firms that is compelling to the OFCCP is also compelling in the courts. By the- 20-
sametoken, the OFCCP can pursue less compelling cases which stand less chance
of success in the courts. Given its limited resources and comparative advantage,
this suggests that the OFCCP temper its pursuit of large firms and divert some
resources towards rases that. are not likely to he reso]ved in privale litigation
because they fall short of court standards.
4.Laurence H. Silberman, Testimony at Hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on
Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92nd Congress, 1st Session,
p.88 (1971).
5.The premise of the above discussion is that no political support would be forth-
coming from markets with elastic supply because no workers surplus could be
generated. If supply is perfectly elastic at wage W0,thenworkers are indifferent
between a given occupation and other pursuits, so they derive no net benefit from
employment in the given occupation. This interpretation depends critically on
the assumption of perfect labor markets. In reality this assumption is violated by
the functioning of labor unions, by government regulations such as minimum
wage and occupational licensing laws, and by the presence of inoluntary unem-
ployment. In any of these cases an excess notional labor supply may exist, either
because wages are artificially maintained above the market clearing level, or
employment is constrained below that level by institutional restrictions or by
firms' output constraints. If observed wages do not clear markets, an unchanging
wage in response to a shifting demand (elastic effective supply) cannot be taken
as evidence of elastic notional supply. The argument that political support is
strongest where supply is inelastic refers to notional, not effective supply, and
goes through even in the presence of wage floors imposed by unions or the
government.
6.An interesting question, of course, is who bears the burden of the affirmative
action tax. If protected group employment gains can only be obtained by an- 21-
absolutereduction in labor demand for white males, then we must assume that
political support is a non-linear function of worker's surplus. This allows large
gains for relatively few blacks to outweigh small Loses for many white males- con-
centrated beneffts outweigh diuse costs. On this basis, one expects greater
conflict in the case of females, whose greater numbers in many occupations pre-
clude their being so easily accommodated.
7.9% of the study sample are no longer reported as contractors in 1980. They are
unlikely to alter the main results reported here, especially since the mode year of
review is rather early: 1975. The sample is not limited to establishment,s which
were contractors in both 1974 and 1980 because exit, from contractor status may
be endogenous to the review process, as it certainly is in the case of debarments.
8.In trying to make sense of how the OFCCP has actually targeted enforcement, ii. is
useful to recognize that the OFCCP, like any other manmade bureaucracy, is
imperfect. Fven if the head knew exactly what it wnl.ed to do, the feet, often
have their own interests and sometimes are stuck in the mud. An extreme is
perhaps the compliance officer who, tiring of a persistent questioners obtuse
refusal to accept 'ad hoc' as a complete description of targeting strategy, finally
explained as one might to a child, that he had a summer place by the beach and
so reviewed oceanside establishments during the summer. In practice, targeting
at the OFCCP has for the most part been done on an ad hoc decentralized basis,
with field officers exercising considerable discretion. Field officers tend to be
evaluated on fulfilling goals for compliance reviews, rather than on successfully
bringing discriminators to heel. Indeed to do otherwise might well invite undesir-
able headhunting. The fastest way to fill a production goal for compliance reviews
is to review firms with good records and good behavior. In practice these will usu-
ally be large firms with well-established systematic record keeping for internal
personnel bureaucracies. They will also tend to be the good corporate citizens- 22-
whohave been reviewed before and found in compliance. If this were in fact the
internal incentive system for field officers, it would not be surprising, from a
bureaucratic perspective, to find that compliance reviews are concentrated on
the ]argest firms that have already been reviewed in the past, and that already
employ the most females and minorities.
9.Letter from J. Griffin Crump, Special Assistant to the Director, OFCCP, December
21, 1982.
10. In regressions of employment growth on reviews and other variables, including
controls for initial size, there is significant evidence of higher growth rates among
reviewed establishments.
11. One might speculate that establishments reviewed after 1974 are those not
reviewed earlier, and so are not the worst offenders. This is doubtful first because
1974 is still an early year in the hisi.ory of affirmative action, especially for
women; second because f-Ieckman and Wolpin find no evidence of such a policy in
1972; third because unless the OFCCP and its predecessors suddenly abandoned a
worst-first policy after 1974, evidence of such a policy should be apparent here;
and fourth because multiple reviews are not rare. Again, if such multiple reviews
•were based on lack of progress from a poor initial position, I would expect to find
evidence here that, reviewed plants were relatively minority and female poor.
Note also that Heckman and Wolpin report that the probability of a review was not
affected by the change in minority employment.
12. The all white male establishments are geographically dispersed, but two-thirds of
them are in the primary and fabricated metals industries, with concentrations in
the 3-digit SIC industries miscellaneous primary metal products, metal cans and
shipping containers, and fabricated. structural metal products. Non-clerical
white-collar workers make up less than 10 of the workforce in these plants.
Segregated plants may be in specialties in which the supply of qualified minorities23 -
orwomen may be low (though not clearly more so here than elsewhere) but this is
not an argument the OFCCP bows to readily, and certainly not before a review.
13. I do not mean to claim here that. the targeting of reviews is fully explained by the
earnings redistribution model, only that the implications of the anti-
discrimination model are not to be found in the data, and that the earnings redis-
tribution rriodel does help explain the lack of systematic pressure on establish-
ments with low protected group employment together with evidence of greater
pressure on white-co]lar intensive empioyers. Given some evidence that reviews
are perverse, not just random, with respect to protected group employment
share, the full rationality of the review process should not be asserted on the
basis of the estimated relationship between reviews and white-collar intensity. In
this regard it is worth noting that even when the six-city analysis is replicated for
the subsample with above average white-collar intensity, the anomalous targeting
with respect to protected group employment share found in Table 7 persists.- 24 -
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S I DTable 1: Proportion of Defense Contractor Establishments That
Were Reviewed from 1975 to 1979, by 1974 Black Male
Employment Share.
N =7968Establishments
Line Black Male Employment Share, 1974 N Proportion Reviewed
1. .00 1773 .106
2. .01—.02 1672 .266
3. .02—.04 1260 .263
4. .04—.06 761 .254
5. .06—.08 490 .255
6. .08—. 10 380 .279
7. .10—.20 911 .301
8. .20—.50 633 .273
9. .50—.70 72 .083
10. .70—1.00 16 .188Table 2: Proportion of Defense Contractor Establishments That
Were Reviewed from 1975 to 1979, by 1974 Female
Employment Share.
N —7968Establishments





















.70-1.00Table 3: Proportion of Defense Contractor Establishments That Were
Reviewed from 1975 to 1979, by 1974 Total Number of
Employees.
N =7968Establishments
Line Si ze N Proportion Reviewed
1. 1—50 702 .030
2. 50—100 1244 .060
3. 100—250 2489 .172
4. 250—500 1611 .326
5. 500750 697 .405
6. 750—1000 372 .450
7. 1000—2000 450 .440
8. 2000—5000 278 .380
9. 5000—8000 78 .290
10. 8000+ 47 .310Table 4: Proportion of Defense Contractor Establishments That
Were Reviewed from 1975 to 1979, by Growth Rate of
Total Employment from 1974 to 1980.
N =7968Establishments
LineGrowth Rate N Proportion Reviewed
1. less than —.30 1247 .205
2. —.30 to —.10 1660 .231
3. —.10 to .10 1927 .246
4. .10 to .30 1277 .233
5. greater than or equal to .30 1857 .233Table 5: Proportion of Defense Contractor Establishments That Were
Reviewed from 1975 to 1979 by Industry.
N =7968Establishments
Proportion
Line Sector SIC N Reviewed
1. Textiles 22 597 .424
2. Apparel 23 364 .393
3. Printing 27 478 .115
4. Leather 31 137 .117
5. Primary Metal 33 805 .190
6. Fabricated Metal 34 1327 .171
7. Machinery 35 1491 .231
8. Electrical Equipment 36 1279 .322
9.Transport. Equip., Air & Land 371—372 687 .249
10.Miscellaneous Manufacturing 39 211 .190
11.Wholesale Misc. Dur. Goods 509 115 .052
12. Retail Car Dealers 551 7 —
13.Retail Apparel Stores 56 67 .015
14.Business Services 731—738 403 .057Table 6: Logit Estimates of the Probability of Compliance
Review Among Defense Contractors, 1975—1979
N =7369
Asymptotic
Variable Estimate Standard Error Mean
o %Non—white Male —.93 .094 .131
1—3 —.25 .081 .236
4—5 —.037 .093 .121
6—10 —.037 .081 .182
11—15 .064 .096 .098
0 % Female —3.49 .277 .009
1—10 —.53 .090 .309
11—20 —.28 .180
21—28 .05 .109 .091
29—50 —.03 .086 .203
North—East —1.31 .10 .44
Plains —.35 .14 .07
South .14 .30
West —.34 .12 .13
Size .O0067 .00009 585
Size2 —5.OxlO 4.OxlO 2233608
Growth .0074 .013 .21
% Non—clerical white—collar .59 .17 .20
Single —1.12 .08 .11
Textiles .53 .18 .08
Apparel .90 .19 .05
Printing —.55 .18 .06
Leather —.46 .23 .02
Primary metal .31 .17 .11
Fabricated metal .17 .16 .18
Machinery .51 .16 .20
Electrical equipment .67 .16 .17
Transport equipment .31 .17 .09
Intercept .99 .19
MSE .156
Mean proportion reviewed .246Table 7: Logit Estimates of the Probability of Compliance Review




Variable Estimate Standard Error Mean
0 % Non—white Male .027 .28 .065
1—3 —.73 .25 .113
4—5 —.24 .26 .094
6—10 —.53 .19 .184
11—15 .30 .21 .133
0 % Female —3.00 .71 .008
1—10 —.44 .24 .299
11—20 —.30 .24 .210
21—28 —.33 .27 .110
29—50 —.32 .22 .224
Los Angeles —.47 .23 .257
Chicago —2.57 .23 .273
Philadelphia .53 .27 .133
Detroit —8.41 .28 .158
San Francisco —1.38 .30 .073
Size .00227 .000098 613
Size2 —2.7x10 l.OxlO 2700704
Growth .072 .028 .202
% Non-clerical white—collar 1.22 .36 .261
Single —.1.49 .20 .114
Textiles .46 .67 .013
Apparel —.27 .55 .024
Printing -.80 .43 .097
Leather —4.15 .88 .006
Primary metal .72 .44 .098
Fabricated metal .57 .41 .219
Machinery .72 .41 .221
Electrical equipment 1.00 .41 .174
Transportation equipment .60 .45 .122
Intercept —1.52 .44
MSE .107
Mean Proportion Reviewed .179